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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
AUDEL BELTRAN, #09-A-0514,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2011-0462.89
INDEX # 2011-1062
ORI #NY016015J

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
The Court has before the Petition for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR
of Audel Beltran, verified on October 5, 2011 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s
office on October 25, 2011. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Bare Hill Correctional
Facility, is challenging the January 2011 determination denying him parole and directing
that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause
on November 1, 2011 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer, verified on
December 15, 2011 and supported by the Affirmation of Brian J. O’Donnell, Esq.,
Assistant Attorney General, dated December 15, 2011. The Court has also received and
reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto, filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on
January 10, 2012.
On January 20, 2009 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, to a controlling determinate term of 8 years, with 5 years post-release
supervision, together with a concurrent indeterminate sentence of 1 to 3 years, upon his
convictions of the crimes of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance 1° and
Conspiracy 2°. The maximum expiration, conditional release and parole eligibility dates
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of petitioner’s merged sentences are calculated by DOCCS officials as June 21, 2015,
April 29, 2014 and April 29, 2014, respectively.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner would not ordinarily be eligible for
discretionary parole release consideration until April 29, 2014 (see Penal Law
§70.40(1)(a)(iii)), on January 4, 2011 he appeared before a Parole Board for early
conditional parole for deportation only (ECPDO) consideration pursuant to Executive
Law §259-i(2)(d). Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying petitioner
ECPDO and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. Both presiding parole
commissioners concurred in the denial determination which reads as follows:
“FOLLOWING CAREFUL REVIEW AND DELIBERATION OF YOUR
RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES THAT
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED DUE TO
CONCERN FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.
THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE PROPERLY WEIGHED AND
CONSIDERED. YOUR INSTANT OFFENSES IN FEBRUARY 2007,
INVOLVED YOUR CONSPIRING WITH CO-DEFENDANTS TO POSSESS
AND TRANSPORT QUANTITIES OF COCAINE. YOUR CRIMINAL
HISTORY INCLUDES ILLEGAL ENTRIES INTO THE UNITED STATES.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMING INDICATES PROGRESS WHICH
IS NOTED. YOUR DISCIPLINARY RECORD APPEARS CLEAN AND IS
LIKEWISE NOTED. BASED ON ALL REQUIRED FACTORS IN THE FILE
CONSIDERED, YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE, AT THIS TIME,
WOULD THUS NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AT LARGE AND WOULD TEND TO DEPRECATE THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE INSTANT OFFENSE(S) AND UNDERMIN
RESPECT FOR THE LAW.”
Upon administrative appeal the denial of discretionary ECPDO release, with the
imposition of a 24-month hold, was affirmed. This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
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violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate; [and] any deportation order issued by the federal government against the
inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where, as here, the minimum period of
imprisonment was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the
seriousness of the underlying offense as well as the inmate’s prior criminal record. See
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).1
Executive Law §259-i(2)(d)(i) provides, in relevant part, that notwithstanding the
provisions of Executive Law §259-i(2)(a),(b) and (c), “ . . . at any time after the inmate’s
period of imprisonment has commenced for an inmate serving a determinate or
indeterminate term of imprisonment, provided that the inmate has a final order of
deportation issued against him . . . if the inmate is subject to deportation by the United
State Bureau Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in addition to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (c) of the subdivision, the board my consider, as a factor warranting earlier
release, the fact that such inmate will be deported, and may grant parole from an

1

The quoted excerpts from Executive Law §§259-i(2)(c)(A) and 259-i(1)(a) are taken from those
statutes as they existed at the time of the January 4, 2011 ECPDO denial determination. Executive Law
§259-i(1) was repealed and Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart
A,§§38-f and 38-f-1. The amendments to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) include the incorporation of
relevant language from repealed Executive Law §259-i(1)(a).
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indeterminate sentence or release for deportation from a determinate sentence to such
inmate conditioned specifically on his prompt deportation.” Thus, notwithstanding the
fact that an inmate meets the statutory criteria for ECPDO eligibility, his/her anticipated
deportation is but one factor to be considered in the process of determining whether or
not to grant ECPDO. Consideration of the usual statutory factors set forth in Executive
Law §§259-i(2)(c) and §259-i(1)(a), as specified in the preceding paragraph, is also
relevant. See Ortiz v. New York State Board of Parole, 239 AD2d 52.
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner alleges that in December of 2010 he received an Earned Eligibility
Certificate (EEC) pursuant to Correction Law §805. He goes on to assert that the statute
creates a rebutable presumption in favor of parole release when an EEC has been issued.
Correction Law §805 provides, in relevant in part, as follows: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, an inmate who is serving a sentence with a minimum term of not more
than eight years and who has been issued a certificate of earned eligibility, shall be
granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term or as authorized by
subdivision four of section eight hundred sixty-seven of this chapter unless the board of
parole determines that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,
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he will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not
compatible with the welfare of society.” In similar fashion, 9 NYCRR §8002.3(c)
provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen the minimum term of imprisonment is in accord
with or greater than the time ranges for imprisonment contained within the guidelines
adopted pursuant to this Part, parole release shall be granted at the expiration of such
minimum term of imprisonment as long as such release is in accordance with the
remaining guideline criteria.”
It is clear that an inmate’s receipt of a EEC does not preclude the Parole Board
from issuing a determination denying discretionary parole release nor does such receipt
preclude the Board from considering the nature of the crime(s) underlying the inmate’s
incarceration, as well as his/her criminal history. See Sanchez v. Division of Parole, 89
AD3d 1305, Rodriguez v. Evans, 82 AD3d 1397, Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354 and
Corley v. New York State Division of Parole, 33 AD3d 1142.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, has held that Correction Law §805
“ . . . creates a presumption in favor of parole release of any inmate who . . . has received
a certificate of earned eligibility and has completed a minium term of imprisonment of
eight years or less.” Wallman v. Travis, 18 AD3d 304, 307 (citations omitted). See
Heitman v. New York State Board of Parole, 214 AD2d 673. The contours of the
“presumption,” however, have not been clearly fleshed out. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, this Court finds no basis for the application of any presumption in favor of
parole release where, as here, the petitioner was considered for ECPDO more than three
years in advance of his April 19, 2014 parole eligibility date. In this regard it is noted that
the “shall be granted parole release” language set forth in Correction Law §805 applies
only upon the expiration of the inmate’s minimum term or upon the inmate’s successful
completion of the DOCCS shock incarceration program, which renders him/her
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immediately eligible for discretionary parole release. See Penal Law §70.40(1)(a)(v).
Although the reference to the expiration of an inmate’s “minimum term,” as set forth in
Correction Law §805, is not readily understood in the case of an inmate, like petitioner,
serving a controlling determinate sentence with a concurrent indeterminate sentence, this
Court finds that the statutory/provision must be read as referencing the date upon which
the inmate becomes eligible for discretionary parole release. Since the petitioner in the
case at bar does not become so eligible until April 29, 2014, he was entitled to no
presumption in favor of ECPDO when he appeared before the Board on January 4, 2011.
Petitioner also contends that “ . . . there was no meaningful discussion or
consideration by the Board of the option to release [him] for deportation . . .” A Parole
Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to
consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennis on, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennis on, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that
it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar the mere fact that petitioner was considered for ECPDO
demonstrates that the Board was well-aware of the final deportation order. In the absence
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of such an order petitioner would not have been eligible for discretionary parole release
until April 29, 2014. In any event, the existence of the final order of deportation to
Mexico, dated November 17, 2009, was specifically noted during the course of petitioner’s
January 4, 2011 Board appearance.
The Court’s review of the Inmate Status Report prepared in conjunction with
petitioner’s ECPDO consideration and the transcript of the January 4, 2011 Parole Board
interview reveals that in addition to information with respect to the final order of
deportation the Board had before it, and considered, other appropriate statutory factors
including petitioner’s programming, vocational and academic achievements, clean
disciplinary record, release plans, as well as the circumstances of the crime underlying his
incarceration and prior record. See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. With regard to the
final two factors referenced in the preceding sentence, the Court notes that during the
course of the January 4, 2011 ECPDO interview the petitioner acknowledge that he and
his co-defendants “ . . . conspired for the shipment of large amounts of cocaine across the
Mexican border in California and ultimately to New York State.” Petitioner also
acknowledged that he had illegally entered the United States on at least three occasions.
In addition, during the course of the January 4, 2011 appearance petitioner was
specifically afforded an opportunity to bring to the Board’s attention any additional
maters he deemed significant. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to
conclude that the Parole Board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl
v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d
828. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the ECPDO determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety. See Sanchez v. Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 1305 and
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Samuel v. Alexander, 69 AD3d 861, app dis 14 NY3d 837.
Finally, to the extent petitioner argues that the provisions of 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b)
precluded the Parole Board from considering the nature/seriousness of the crime
underlying his incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record, this Court rejects such
argument. The regulation in questions is not applicable where an inmate’s minimum
period of imprisonment was established by his/her sentencing court. See Hall v. New
York State Division of Parole, 66 AD3d 1322, Guerin v. New York State Division of
Parole, 276 AD2d 899 and Flecha v. Travis, 246 AD2d 720. This Court finds no basis to
apply the regulatory restriction where, as here, all elements of petitioner’s controlling
determinate term and concurrent indeterminate sentence were set by the sentencing
court.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

March 13, 2012 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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